Adversarial Radar Inference. From Inverse Tracking to Inverse
  Reinforcement Learning of Cognitive Radar by Krishnamurthy, Vikram
Vikram Krishnamurthy February 26, 2020 1
Adversarial Radar Inference. From Inverse Tracking to Inverse
Reinforcement Learning of Cognitive Radar
Vikram Krishnamurthy, School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Cornell University,
vikramk@cornell.edu
1 Introduction
Cognitive sensing refers to a reconfigurable sensor that dynamically adapts its sensing mechanism
by using stochastic control to optimize its sensing resources. For example, cognitive radars are
sophisticated dynamical systems; they use stochastic control to sense the environment, learn fro¡m
it relevant information about the target and background, then adapt the radar sensor to satisfy the
needs of their mission. The last two decades have witnessed intense research in cognitive/adaptive
radars [15, 32, 33, 21].
This chapter discusses addresses the next logical step, namely inverse cognitive sensing. By ob-
serving the emissions of a sensor (e.g. radar or in general a controlled stochastic dynamical system)
in real time, how can we detect if the sensor is cognitive (rational utility maximizer) and how can
we predict its future actions? The scientific challenges involve extending Bayesian filtering, in-
verse reinforcement learning and stochastic optimization of dynamical systems to a data-driven
adversarial setting. Our methodology transcends classical statistical signal processing (sensing
and estimation/detection theory) to address the deeper issue of how to infer strategy from sensing.
The generative models, adversarial inference algorithms and associated mathematical analysis will
lead to advances in understanding how sophisticated adaptive sensors such as cognitive radars op-
erate. As will be discussed below, the framework involves the interaction of two DDDAS (dynamic
data driven applications systems).
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Figure 1: Schematic of Adversarial Inference Problem. “Our” side is a drone/UAV or electromagnetic
signal that probes the enemy’s cognitive sensor (e.g. radar). Given our state sequence {xk} and observed
enemy’s actions {ak}, our aims are to: (i) Estimate the enemy’s belief (posterior) pik and its sensor accuracy
(ii) Optimally probe the enemy with {xk} to minimize the variance of our estimate of its accuracy
(iii) Determine if the enemy is cognitive (rational utility maximizer), and estimate its utility function
(iv) Track time varying equilibria in a game theoretic setting
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1.1 Objectives
The central theme involves an adversarial signal processing problem comprised of “us” and an
“adversary”. “Us” refers to a drone/UAV or electromagnetic signal that probes an “adversary”
cognitive sensing system. Figure 1 shows the schematic setup. A cognitive sensor observes our
kinematic state xk in noise as the observation yk. It then uses a Bayesian tracker to update its
posterior distribution pik of our state xk and chooses an action uk based on this posterior. We
observe the sensor’s action in noise as ak. Given knowledge of “our” state sequence {xk} and the
observed actions {ak} taken by the enemy’s sensor, this project focuses on the following inter-
related aspects; each topic below is backed by extensive preliminary research and results:
1. Inverse filtering and Estimating the Enemy’s Sensor Gain. How to estimate the enemy’s
estimate of us? Suppose the enemy observes our state in noise; updates its posterior distribution
pik of our state xk and then chooses an action uk based on this posterior. Given knowledge of “our”
state and sequence of enemy’s actions observed in noise {ak}, how can the enemy’s posterior
distribution (random measure) be estimated? We will develop computationally efficient filtering
algorithms with performance bounds.
A related question is: How to remotely estimate the enemy’s sensor observation likelihood when
it is estimating us? This is important because it tells us how accurate the enemy’s sensor is; in
the context of Figure 1 it tells us, how accurately the enemy tracks our drone. The data we have
access to is our state (probe signal) {xk} and measurements of the enemy’s radar actions {ak}.
Estimating the enemy’s sensor accuracy is non-trivial with several challenges. First, even though
we know our state and state dynamics model (transition law), the enemy does not. The enemy
needs to estimate our state and state transition law based on our trajectory; and we need to estimate
the enemy’s estimate of our state transition law. Second, computing the maximum likelihood
estimate of the enemy’s sensor gain involves inverse filtering; as shown in our preliminary work,
the convergence rate of numerical algorithms to compute the estimate is substantially slower than
classical maximum likelihood estimation. We will also study identifiability issues and consistency
properties of the resulting maximum likelihood estimator.
2. Optimal Probing of Adversary. Referring to Figure 1, how can we optimally probe the en-
emy’s sensor to minimize the covariance of our estimate of the enemy’s observation likelihood?
“Our” state can be viewed as a probe signal which causes the adversary’s radar to act; so choos-
ing the optimal state sequence is an input/experimental design problem. We will consider two
approaches. The first approach is analytical – using stochastic dominance, we will establish a par-
tial ordering amongst probe transition matrices which results in a corresponding ordering of our
SNR of the adversary’s actions. The second approach is numerical – we will construct stochastic
gradient algorithms to optimize the probe transition matrix.
3. Revealed Preferences and Inverse Reinforcement Learning. Our working assumption is that
a cognitive sensor satisfies economic rationality, i.e., a cognitive sensor is a utility maximizer that
optimizes its actions ak subject to physical level (Bayesian filter) constraints. How can we detect
this utility maximization behavior? Nonparametric detection of utility maximization behavior is
the central theme of revealed preferences in microeconomics. A remarkable result is Afriat’s the-
orem: it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a finite dataset to have originated from
a utility maximizer. We will develop constrained utility estimation methods in a Bayesian frame-
work that account for signal processing constraints introduced by the Bayesian tracker. These
impose nonlinear constraints involving the spectrum (eigenvalues) of the achieved covariance of
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the tracker; such spectral revealed preferences require generalizing the classical Afriat theorem.
When the enemy’s actions are observed in noise, how can a statistical detector be constructed to
test for utility maximization behavior? We will also address the related issue of: How can our
state (probe signal) be chosen by us to minimize the Type 2 error of detecting if the adversary is
deploying an economic rational strategy, subject to a constraint on the Type 1 detection error?
1.2 Perspective and Context. Relevance to DDDAS
The adversarial dynamics considered in this chapter fit naturally within the Dynamic Data Driven
Applications Systems (DDDAS) paradigm. The adversary’s radar senses, adapts and learns from
us. In turn we adapt sense and learn from the adversary. So in simple terms we are modeling
and analyzing the interaction of two DDDAS. In this context this chapter has two major themes:
inverse filtering which is a Bayesian framework for interacting DDDAS, and inverse cognitive
sensing which is a non-parametric approach for utility estimation for interacting DDDAS.
Here are some unusual features that motivate the ideas in this chapter:
(i) Slow Learning: Inverse filtering (estimating the enemy’s estimate of us) has slow conver-
gence - given n data points the covariance decreases as O(n−1/3), whereas the classical
Kalman filter covariance decreases as O(n−1). The change in convergence speed exhibits
a remarkable phase transition.
(ii) Data driven approach: The revealed preference approach is fundamentally different to the
model-centric theme that is widely used in signal processing where one postulates an objec-
tive function (typically convex) and then proposes optimization algorithms. In contrast, the
revealed preference approach is data centric - given a dataset, we wish to determine if is con-
sistent with utility maximization, i.e., if the sensor is satisfies economics-based rationality.
(iii) Classical inverse reinforcement learning aims to estimate the utility function of a decision
maker by observing its decisions and input state [43]; the existence of a utility function (ra-
tionality) is assumed implicitly. The revealed preference approach considered in this chapter
addresses a deeper and more fundamental question: does a utility function exist that rational-
izes the given data (with signal processing constraints) and if yes, estimate it. As discussed
below, inverse reinforcement learning is a trivial case of revealed preferences.
(iv) Finally, this chapter is an early step in understanding how to design stealthy cognitive sensors
whose cognitive functionality is difficult to detect by an observer. (In simple terms, how to
design a smart sensor that acts dumb?). This generalizes the physics based low-probability of
intercept (LPI) requirement of radar (which requires low power emission) to the systems-level
issue: How should the sensor choose its actions in order to avoid detection of its cognition?
This work is also motivated by the design of counter-autonomous systems: given measure-
ments of the actions of an autonomous adversary, how can our counter-autonomous system
estimate the underlying belief of the adversary, predict future actions and therefore guard
against these actions. Specifically, [37] places counter unmanned autonomous systems at a
level of abstraction above the physical sensors/actuators/weapons and datalink layers; and
below the human controller layer.
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2 Inverse Filtering and Estimating Enemy’s Sensor
This section discusses inverse filtering in an adversarial system, see Figure 2 for the schematic
setup. Our main ideas involve estimating the enemy’s estimate of us and estimating the enemy’s
sensor observation likelihood.
2.1 Background and Preliminary Work
Sensor
Decision
Maker
Tracker
T (pik−1,yk)
ukyk
pik
action ak
probe xk
Our sideAdversary
(a) Schematic of Adversarial Inference Problem.
Our side is a drone/UAV or electromagnetic signal
that probes the adversary’s cognitive radar system.
x0 x1 x2 xk. . .
y1 y2 yk
pi1pi0 pi2 pik. . .
a1 a2 ak
(b) Graphical representation of inverse filtering
problem (1). The shaded nodes are known to us,
while the white nodes are unknown. This is differ-
ent to classical filtering where y1, . . . ,yk are known
and pik is to be estimated.
Figure 2: Schematic and Graphical representation of adversarial inverse filtering problem consid-
ered in this chapter.
The problem formulation involves two players; “us” and “adversary”. With k = 1,2, . . . denoting
discrete time, the model has the following dynamics:
xk ∼ Pxk−1,x = p(x|xk−1), x0 ∼ pi0
yk ∼ Bxk,y = p(y|xk)
pik = T (pik−1,yk)
ak ∼ Gpik,a = p(a|pik)
(1)
Let us explain the notation in (1):
• xk ∈X is our Markovian state with transition kernel Pxk−1,x, prior pi0 and state spaceX .
• yk is the adversary’s noisy observation of our state xk; with observation likelihoods Bxy.
• pik = p(xk|y1:k) is the adversary’s belief (posterior) of our state xk where y1:k denotes the
sequence y1, . . . ,yk. The operator T in (1) is the classical Bayesian optimal filter
T (pi,y)(x) =
Bx,y
∫
X Pζ ,xpi(ζ )dζ∫
X Bx,y
∫
X Pζ ,xpi(ζ )dζdx
(2)
Let Π denote the space of all such beliefs. When the state space X is finite, then Π is the
unit X−1 dimensional simplex of X-dimensional probability mass functions.
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• ak denotes our measurement of the adversary’s action based on its current belief pik. More
explicitly, the adversary chooses an action uk as a deterministic function of pik and we observe
uk in noise as ak. We encode this as Gpik,ak ; this is the conditional probability of observing
action ak given the adversary’s belief pik.
Figure 2 displays a schematic and graphical representation of the model (1). The schematic model
shows “us” and the adversary’s variables. In the graphical model, the shaded nodes are known to
us, while the white nodes are computed by the adversary and unknown to us. This is in contrast to
classical filtering where yk is known to us and xk is to be estimated, i.e, pik is to be computed.
Aim: Referring to model (1) and Figure 2, our aims are:
1. How to estimate the adversary’s belief given measurements of its actions (which are based
on its filtered estimate of our state)? In other words, assuming probability distributions
P,B,G are known, we aim to estimate the adversary’s belief pik at each time k, by computing
posterior p(pik | pi0,x0:k,a1:k).
2. How to estimate the enemy’s observation kernel B, i.e its sensor gain? This tells us how
accurate the enemy’s sensor is.
From a practical point of view, estimating the enemy’s belief and sensor parameters allows us to
calibrate its accuracy and predict (in a Bayesian sense) future actions of the enemy.
Related Works. In our recent works [39, 40, 38], the mapping from belief pi to enemy’s action a
was assumed deterministic. Specifically, [39] gives a deterministic regression based approach to es-
timate the adversary’s model parameters in a Hidden Markov model. In comparison, our proposed
research here assumes a probabilistic map between pi and a and we develop Bayesian filtering al-
gorithms for estimating the posterior along with MLE algorithms for θ . Estimating/reconstructing
the posterior given decisions based on the posterior is studied in microeconomics under the area of
social learning [14, 41] and game-theoretic generalizations [6]. There are strong parallels between
inverse filtering and Bayesian social learning [14], [29, 28, 27]; the key difference is that social
learning aims to estimate the underlying state given noisy posteriors, whereas our aim is to esti-
mate the posterior given noisy measurements of the posterior and the underlying state. Recently,
[24] used cascaded Kalman filters for LQG control over communication channels.
2.2 Inverse Filtering Algorithms
How to estimate the enemy’s posterior distribution pik of us?
Here we discuss inverse filtering for special cases of the model (1). Define the posterior distribution
αk(pik) = p(pik|a1:k,x0:k) of the adversary’s posterior distribution given our state sequence x0:k and
actions a1:k: Note that the posterior αk(·) is a random measure since it is a posterior distribution
of the adversary’s posterior distribution (belief) pik. By using a discrete time version of Girsanov’s
theorem and appropriate change of measure1 [17] (or a careful application of Bayes rule) we can
derive the following functional recursion for αk:
αk+1(pi) =
Gpi,ak+1
∫
ΠBxk+1,ypik ,pi αk(pik)dpik∫
ΠGpi,ak+1
∫
ΠBxk+1,ypik ,pi αk(pik)dpik dpi
(3)
1This chapter deals with discrete time. Although we will not pursue it here, our recent paper [35] uses a similar
continuous time formulation. This yields interesting results involving Malliavin derivatives and stochastic calculus.
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Here ypik,pi is the observation such that pi = T (pik,y) where T is the adversary’s filter (2). We call
(3) the optimal inverse filter since it yields the Bayesian posterior of the adversary’s belief given
our state and noisy measurements of the adversary’s actions.
Example: Inverse Kalman Filter
We consider a second special case of (3) where the inverse filtering problem admits a finite di-
mensional characterization in terms of the Kalman filter. Consider a linear Gaussian state space
model
xk+1 = Axk +wk, x0 ∼ pi0
yk =C xk + vk
(4)
where xk ∈X = IRX is “our” state with initial density pi0 ∼ N(xˆ0,Σ0), yk ∈ Y = IRY denotes the
adversary’s observations, wk ∼ N(0,Qk), vk ∼ N(0,Rk) and {wk}, {vk} are mutually independent
i.i.d. processes.
Based on observations y1:k, the adversary computes the belief pik = N(xˆk,Σk) where xˆk is the con-
ditional mean state estimate and Σk is the covariance; these are computed via the classical Kalman
filter equations:2
Σk+1|k = AΣkA′+Q
Sk+1 =CΣk+1|kC′+R
xˆk+1 = Axˆk +Σk+1|kC′S−1k+1(yk+1−C Axˆk)
Σk+1 = Σk+1|k−Σk+1|kC′S−1k+1CΣk+1|k
(7)
The adversary then chooses its action as a¯k = φ(Σk) xˆk for some pre-specified function3 φ . We
measure the adversary’s action as
ak = φ(Σk) xˆk + εk, εk ∼ iid N(0,σ2ε ) (8)
The Kalman covariance Σk is deterministic and fully determined by the model parameters. So
to estimate the belief pik = N(xˆk,Σk) we only need to estimate xˆk at each time k given a1:k,x0:k.
Substituting (4) for yk+1 in (7), we see that (7), (8) constitute a linear Gaussian system with un-
observed state xˆk, observations ak, and known exogenous input xk:
xˆk+1 = (I−ψk+1C)Axˆk +ψk+1vk+1+ψk+1Cxk+1
ak = φ(Σk) xˆk + εk, εk ∼ iid N(0,σ2ε )
where ψk+1 = Σk+1|kC′S−1k+1
(9)
2For localization problems, we will use the information filter form:
Σ−1k+1 = Σ
−1
k+1|k +C
′R−1C, ψk+1 = Σk+1C′R−1 (5)
Similarly, the inverse Kalman filter in information form reads
Σ¯−1k+1 = Σ¯
−1
k+1|k +C¯
′
k+1R¯
−1C¯k+1, ψ¯k+1 = Σ¯k+1C¯′k+1R¯
−1. (6)
3This choice is motivated by linear quadratic Gaussian control where the action (control) is chosen as a linear
function of the estimated state xˆk weighed by the covariance matrix
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ψk+1 is called the Kalman gain.
To summarize, our filtered estimate of the adversary’s filtered estimate xˆk given measurements
a1:k,x0:k is achieved by running “our” Kalman filter on the linear Gaussian state space model (9),
where xˆk,ψk,Σk in (9) are generated by the adversary’s Kalman filter. Therefore, our Kalman filter
uses the parameters
A¯k = (I−ψk+1C)A, F¯k = ψk+1C, C¯k = φ(Σk),
Q¯k = ψk+1ψ ′k+1, R¯ = σ
2
ε
(10)
The equations of our inverse Kalman filter are:
Σ¯k+1|k = A¯kΣ¯kA¯′k + Q¯k
S¯k+1 = C¯k+1Σ¯k+1|kC¯′k+1+ R¯
ˆˆxk+1 = A¯k ˆˆxk + Σ¯k+1|kC¯′k+1S¯
−1
k+1
×[ak+1−C¯k+1 (A¯kxˆk + F¯kxk+1)]
Σ¯k+1 = Σ¯k+1|k− Σ¯k+1|kC¯′k+1S¯−1k+1C¯k+1Σ¯k+1|k
(11)
Note ˆˆxk and Σ¯k denote our conditional mean estimate and covariance of the adversary’s conditional
mean xˆk. The computational cost of the inverse Kalman filter is identical to the classical Kalman
filter, namely O(X2) computations at each time step.
Remarks:
1. As discussed in [36], inverse Hidden Markov model (HMM) filters and inverse particle filters
can be derived. For example, the inverse HMM filter deals with the case when pik is computed
via a Hidden Markov model (HMM) filter and the estimates of the HMM filter are observed
in noise. In this case the inverse filter has a computational cost that grows exponentially with
the size of the observation alphabet.
2. In filtering it is important to determine conditions under which the filter forgets its initial
condition geometrically fast (this is often called stability of the filter). In future work, it
is worthwhile obtaining minorization conditions for the geometric ergodicity of the inverse
HMM filter, namely, conditions on our transition matrix, enemy’s observation matrix and our
observation of the enemy’s action matrix so that the inverse filter forgets its initial condition
geometrically fast.
3. A general approximation solution for (3) involves sequential Markov chain Monte-Carlo
(particle filtering). In particle filtering, cases where it is possible to sample from the so
called optimal importance function are of significant interest [44, 12]. In inverse filtering,
our paper [36] shows that the optimal importance function can be determined explicitly due
to the structure of the inverse filtering problem. Specifically, in our case, the “optimal”
importance density is pi∗ = p(pik,yk|pik−1,yk−1,xk,ak). Note that in our case
pi∗ = p(pik|pik−1,yk) p(yk|xk,ak) = δ
(
pik−T (pik−1,yk)
)
p(yk|xk)
is straightforward to sample from. There has been a substantial amount of recent research in
finite sample concentration bounds for the particle filter. We will use these results to evaluate
the so called sample complexity of the resulting particle filter.
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2.3 Slow Learning: Cascaded Kalman Filters and Phase-Transition
How to quantify slow learning in cascaded Bayesian filters?
In simple terms, inverse filtering discussed above involves cascaded optimal filters where the sec-
ond filter uses the estimates generated by the first filter. We now outline our plans to study a
remarkable property involving two cascaded Kalman filter where the first Kalman filter feeds its
estimate to the second Kalman filter, and the second Kalman filter feeds its estimate to the first
Kalman filter. Below we will discuss an adversarial example involving localizing a drone.
Kalman
Filter 1
Kalman
Filter 2
yk = x0+ vk ak = xˆk + εkxˆk
Σk
ˆˆxk
Σˆk
Figure 3: Slow Learning with Two Kalman Filters in Series. The remarkable point is that the
covariance Σk =O(k−1/3) instead of O(k−1) thereby resulting in slow learning. In our terminology,
Kalman filter 2 is the inverse Kalman filter that uses noisy estimates ak from Kalman filter 1
To illustrate the main idea, consider a Gaussian random variable scalar state x0 ∈ IR (instead of
a random process). The first Kalman filter obtains Gaussian measurements yk of x0. It uses yk
together with the prior ˆˆxk−1 from the second Kalman filter to compute the estimate xˆk at time k.
The second Kalman filter observes xˆk from the first Kalman filter in Gaussian noise as ak = xˆk+εk
where εk is an iid Gaussian sequence with zero mean and variance σ2ε . The second Kalman filter
then uses ak to estimate x0. Call the estimate generated by the second Kalman filter as ˆˆxk. This
estimate ˆˆxk is then fed back to the first Kalman filter.
Two remarkable properties of the above setup are (see also [51, 52, 14])
• The covariance decreases with time k as Σk = O(k−1/3) instead of O(k−1) in the standard
Kalman filter. This depicts “slow learning” of the inverse Kalman filter (in Fig.3).
• This rate of slow learning is independent of the variance σ2ε as long as σ2ε is strictly positive.
Note that if σ2ε = 0, then Σk = O(k−1). This shows that a cascaded model of two Kalman
filters where the second Kalman filter observes the first Kalman has a phase change in be-
havior: when the estimates of the first Kalman filter are corrupted even by small amounts of
noise, the convergence rate slows down drastically to O(k−1/3).
Example. Sequential Localization Game
Thus far we assumed that x0 is known to us and our aim was to estimate the adversary’s estimate.
Consider now the following localization game. Suppose that neither us nor the adversary know the
underlying state x0. For example, x0 could denote the threat level of an autonomous drone hovering
relative to a specific location as shown in Figure 4. Second, there is feedback; the adversary’s
action affects our estimate and our action affects the adversary’s estimate. The setup is naturally
formulated in game-theoretic terms. The adversary and us play a sequential game to localize
(estimate) x0.
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Our
Kalman
filter
Enemy’s
Kalman
filter
intercepted
action
Figure 4: Sequential Localization Game Schematic
1. At odd time instants k = 1,3, . . ., the adversary takes active measurements of the target and
makes decisions based on its estimate. We eavesdrop on the adversary’s decisions and apply
Bayes rule to estimate (localize) the target’s state x0. The details are as follows:
(i) The adversary observes our action uk−1 = xˆk−1 in noise as ak−1 = xˆk−1 + εk−1 where
εk−1 ∼ N(0,σ2ε ). The adversary assumes that our state estimate is ak−1.
(ii) The adversary takes a direct measurement yk of x0 and uses its Kalman filter (7) to update
its state estimate:
xˆk = (1−ψk)ak−1+ψkyk,
where ψk is the associated covariance update.
(iii) The adversary then takes action uk = xˆk. This action minimizes the mean square error
of the estimate.
(iv) We eavesdrop on (observe) the adversary’s action in noise as ak = xˆk + εk. Assume
εk ∼ N(0,σ2ε ) iid. So
ak = (1−ψk)ak−1+ψkvk +ψkx0+ εk
Since ak−1 = uk−1+εk−1, we can define an observation zk that is informationally equivalent
to ak as
zk
defn
=
ak
ψk
− 1−ψk
ψk
uk−1 =
1−ψk
ψk
εk−1+ vk +
εk
ψk
+ x0 (12)
We know zk; uk−1 was our action at time k−1, and ak is our measurement of the adversary’s
action at time k.
To summarize, at odd time instants, zk specified in (12) is our effective observation of the
unknown state x0 purely based on sensing the adversary’s actions.
2. At even time instants k = 2,4, . . . , we take active measurements yk of the target’s state x0.
Then we update our estimate of our target using the Kalman filter.
The above setup constitutes a social learning sequential game [42]. Since the decisions are made
myopically each time (to minimize the mean square error), the strategy profile at each time consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium. More importantly [42, Theorem 5], the asymptotic behavior (in time) is
captured by a social learning equilibrium (SLE).
Theorem 2.1 ([36]). Consider the sequential game formulation for localizing the random variable
state x0. Then for large k, the covariance of our estimate of the state x0 is Σk = 2k−1 (which is
twice the covariance for classical localization).
Remark. Theorem 2.1 has two interesting consequences.
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1. The asymptotic covariance is independent of σ2ε (i.e. SNR of our observation of the ad-
versary’s action) as long as σ2ε > 0. If σ2ε = 0, there is a phase change and the covariance
Σk = k−1 as in the standard Kalman filter.
2. In the special case where only (12) is observed at each time (and the εk−1 term is omitted),
the formulation reduces to the Bayesian social learning problem of [14, Chapter 3]. In that
case, [14, Proposition 3.1] shows that Σk = O(k−1/3). The remarkable property is that this
rate of slow learning is independent of the variance σ2ε as long as σ2ε is strictly positive
[51, 52]. As discussed in [14], this result implies that models where one assumes that the
enemy’s action is observed perfectly are not robust; any noise in the observation process
drastically reduces the rate of convergence of the estimator.
To summarize, Theorem 2.1 confirms the intuition that sequentially learning the state indirectly
from the adversary’s actions (and the adversary learning the state from our actions) slows down
the convergence of the localization estimator.
The above setup constitutes a social learning sequential game [42]. Since the decisions are made
myopically each time (to minimize the mean square error), the strategy profile at each time consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium. More importantly [42, Theorem 5], the asymptotic behavior (in time) is
captured by a social learning equilibrium (SLE).
2.4 Estimating the Enemy’s Sensor Gain
Thus far we have discussed Bayesian estimation of the adversary’s belief state. We now discuss
how to estimate the enemy’s sensor observation kernel B in (1) which quantifies the accuracy of the
adversary’s sensors. We assume that B is parametrized by an M-dimensional vector θ ∈ Θ where
Θ is a compact subset of IRM. Denote the parametrized observation kernel as Bθ . Assume that both
us and the adversary know P (state transition kernel4) and G (probabilistic map from adversary’s
belief to its action). Then given our state sequence x0:N and adversary’s action sequence a1:N , our
aim is to compute the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ . That is, with LN(θ) denoting the
log likelihood, the aim is to compute
θ ∗ = argmax
θ∈Θ
LN(θ), LN(θ) = log p(x0:N ,a1:N |θ).
The likelihood can be evaluated from the un-normalized inverse filtering recursion (3)
LN(θ) = log
∫
Π
qθN(pi)dpi, q
θ
k+1(pi) = Gpi,ak+1
∫
Π
Bθxk+1,yθpik ,pi
qθk (pik)dpik (13)
Given (13), a local stationary point of the likelihood can be computed using a general purpose
numerical optimization algorithm.
Remark. EM Algorithm is not useful: The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is a popular
numerical algorithm for computing the MLE especially when the Maximization (M) step can be
computed in closed form. Unfortunately, for estimating the adversary’s observation model, due
to the time evolving dynamics in the inverse Kalman filter, the EM algorithm is not useful since
the M-step involves a non-convex optimization that cannot be done in closed form. There is no
obvious way of choosing the latent variables to avoid this.
4As mentioned earlier, otherwise the adversary estimates P as Pˆ and we need to estimate the adversary’s estimate
as ˆˆP. This makes the estimation task substantially more complex.
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Example. Estimating Adversary’s Gain in Linear Gaussian case
Consider the setup in Sec.2.2 where our dynamics are linear Gaussian and the adversary observes
our state linearly in Gaussian noise (4). The adversary estimates our state using a Kalman filter,
and we estimate the adversary’s estimate using the inverse Kalman filter (9). Using (9), (10), the
log likelihood for the adversary’s observation gain matrix α =C based on our measurements is
LN(θ) = const− 12
N
∑
k=1
log |S¯αk |−
1
2
N
∑
k=1
ι ′k (S¯
α
k )
−1 ιk
ιk = ak−C¯αk A¯αk−1 ˆˆxk−1− F¯αk−1xk−1 (14)
where ιk are the innovations of the inverse Kalman filter (11). In (14), our state xk−1 is known to
us and therefore is a known exogenous input. Also note from (10) that A¯k, F¯k are explicit functions
of C, while C¯k and Q¯k depend on C via the adversary’s Kalman filter.
Using (13), the log likelihood for the adversary’s observation gain matrix α =C can be evaluated
To provide insight, Figure 5 displays the log-likelihood versus adversary’s gain matrix C in the
scalar case for 1000 data points. The four sub-figures correspond to true values of Co = 1.5,3
respectively.
Each sub-figure in Figure 5 has two plots. The plot in red is the log-likelihood of Cˆ ∈ (0,10]
evaluated based on the adversary’s observations using the standard Kalman filter. (This is the
classical log-likelihood of the observation gain of a Gaussian state space model.) The plot in blue
is the log-likelihood of C ∈ (0,10] computed using our measurements of the adversary’s action
using the inverse Kalman filter (where the adversary first estimates our state using a Kalman filter)
- we call this the inverse case.
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Figure 5: Log-Likelihood as a function of enemy’s gain C ∈ (0,10] when true value is Co. The red
curves denote the log-likelihood of C given the enemy’s measurements. The blue curves denotes
the log-likelihood of C using the inverse Kalman filter given our observations of the enemy’s action.
The plots show that it is more difficult to compute the MLE for the inverse filtering problem due
to the almost flat likelihood (blue curves) compared to red curves.
Figure 5 shows that the log likelihood in the inverse case (blue plots) has a less pronounced max-
imum compared to the standard case (red plots). Therefore, numerical algorithms for computing
the MLE of the enemy’s gain using our observations of the adversary’s actions (via the inverse
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Co Classic Inverse
0.5 0.24×10−3 5.3×10−3
1.5 1.2×10−3 37×10−3
2 2.1×10−3 70×10−3
3 4.6×10−3 336×10−3
Table 1: Comparison of Cramer Rao bounds for C - classical model vs inverse Kalman filter model
Kalman filter) will converge much more slowly than the classical MLE (based on the adversary’s
observations). This is intuitive since our estimate of the adversary’s parameter is based on the
adversary’s estimate of our state and so has more noise.
Cramer Rao (CR) bounds. Is it instructive to compare the CR bounds for MLE of C for the
classic model versus that of the inverse Kalman filter model. Table 1 displays the CR bounds (re-
ciprocal of expected Fisher information) for the four examples considered above evaluated using
via the algorithm in [13]. It shows that the covariance lower bound for the inverse case is substan-
tially higher than that for the classic case. This is consistent with the intuition that estimating the
adversary’s parameter based on its actions (which is based on its estimate of us) is more difficult
than directly estimating C in a classical state space model.
Remarks:
1. Consistency of MLE. The above example shows that the likelihood surface of LN(θ) =
log p(x0:N ,a1:N |θ) is flat and hence compute the MLE numerically can be difficult. Even
in the case when we observe the enemy’s actions perfectly, our NIPS paper [39] shows that
non-trivial observability conditions need to be imposed on the system parameters.
For the linear Gaussian case where we observe the enemy’s Kalman filter in noise, consis-
tency of the MLE for the for the adversary’s gain matrix C, the strong consistency can be
shown fairly straightforwardly. Specifically, if we assume that state matrix A is stable, and
the state space model is an identifiable minimal realization, then the enemy’s Kalman filter
variables converge to steady state values geometrically fast in k [5] implying that asymptot-
ically the inverse Kalman filter system is stable linear time invariant. Then , the MLE θ ∗ for
the adversary’s observation matrix C is unique and a strongly consistent estimator [9].
2. Estimating the enemy’s estimate of our dynamics (transition matrix) It is of interest to de-
velop algorithms to estimate the enemy’s estimate of our transition matrix and analyze their
performance. The adversary estimates P as Pˆ and we need to estimate the adversary’s esti-
mate as ˆˆP. In future work we will examine conditions under which the MLE is identifiable
and consistent.
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3 Inverse Cognitive Radar – Revealed Preferences and Inverse
Reinforcement Learning
The previous section was concerned with estimating the enemy’s posterior belief and sensor ac-
curacy. This section discusses detecting utility maximization behavior and estimating the enemy’s
utility function in the context of cognitive radars.
Cognitive radars [20] use the perception-action cycle of cognition to sense the environment, learn
from it relevant information about the target and the background, then adapt the radar sensor to
optimally satisfy the needs of their mission. A crucial element of a cognitive radar is optimal
adaptivity: based on its tracked estimates, the radar adaptively optimizes the waveform, aperture,
dwell time and revisit rate. In other words, a cognitive radar is a constrained utility maximizer.
This section is motivated by the next logical step, namely, inverse cognitive radar. The enemy’s
cognitive radar observes our state in noise; it uses a Bayesian estimator (target tracking algorithm)
to update its posterior distribution of our state and then chooses an action based on this posterior.
From the intercepted emissions of an enemy’s radar:
A: Are the enemy sensor’s actions consistent with optimizing a monotone utility function (i.e.,
is the cognitive sensor behavior rational in an economics sense)? If so how can we estimate
a utility function of the enemy’s cognitive sensor that is consistent with its actions?
B: How to construct a statistical detection test for utility maximization when we observe the
enemy sensor’s actions in noise?
C: How can we optimally probe the enemy’s sensor by choosing our state to minimize the
Type 2 error of detecting if the radar is deploying an economic rational strategy, subject to a
constraint on the Type 1 detection error? “Our” state can be viewed as a probe signal which
causes the enemy’s sensor to act.
D: How to detect utility maximization of a Bayesian adversary that is rationally inattentive?
Rational inattention (from behavioral economics) introduces an information theoretic cost to
the accuracy of an observation.
The main synthesis/analysis framework we will use is that of revealed preferences [50, 19, 16] from
microeconomics which aims to determine preferences by observing choices. The results presented
below are developed in detail in our recent paper [30].
Classical Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) vs Revealed Preferences. Since we focus on
revealed preferences, it is worthwhile comparing it with inverse reinforcement learning.
• Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to estimate the cost vector c (which depends only
on the state) of an infinite horizon Markov decision process (MDP) by observing the deci-
sions and knowing the controlled transition probabilities [43]. The idea in [43] is simple: If
the decisions a are chosen from optimal policy µ∗, then the infinite horizon cumulative cost
satisfies L(µ∗,c)≤ L(µ,c) for any policy µ . Also L(µ,c) is a linear function of cost vector
c, i.e., L(µ,c) = H(µ)c where matrix H(µ) depends on the transition matrix and discount
factor. Since there are only a finite number of possible policies µ (as the state and action
space are finite), clearly the cost vector c satisfies the finite number of linear inequalities:
[H(µ∗)−H(µ)]c≤ 0, µ = 1,2, . . . ,U (15)
Note also that in IRL, the existence of a utility/cost function is assumed implicitly.
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Figure 6: Schematic of Adversarial Inference Problem. Our side is a drone/UAV or electromag-
netic signal that probes the enemy’s cognitive radar system. k denotes a fast time scale and n
denotes a slow time scale. Our state xk, parameterized by αn (purposeful acceleration maneuvers),
probes the adversary radar. Based on the noisy observation yk of our state, the enemy radar re-
sponds with action βn. Our aim is to determine if the enemy radar is economic rational, i.e., is its
response βn generated by constrained optimizing a utility function?
• The revealed preference approach that we consider addresses a deeper and more fundamen-
tal question: does a utility function exist that rationalizes the given data with budget con-
straints? If so, estimate this utility function. Indeed IRL (15) is a trivial case of the revealed
preference framework. It is surprising that despite powerful revealed preference methods be-
ing developed since the 1960s (e.g. Afriat’s theorem), and numerous advances subsequently,
the machine learning community is completely oblivious to this. Finally we note that the
first result in IRL was developed by Kalman [25] in the 1964 under the terminology “inverse
optimal control”.
3.1 Background. Revealed Preferences and Afriat’s Theorem
Nonparametric detection of utility maximization behavior is the central theme in the area of re-
vealed preferences in microeconomics. We briefly outline a key result.
Definition 3.1 ([2, 3]). A system is a utility maximizer if for every probe αn ∈ IRm+, the response
βn ∈ IRm satisfies
βn ∈ argmax
α ′nβ≤1
U(β ) (16)
where U(β ) is a monotone utility function.
In economics, αn is the price vector and βn the consumption vector. Then α ′nβ ≤ 1 is a natural
budget constraint5 for a consumer with 1 dollar. Given a dataset of price and consumption vectors,
the aim is to determine if the consumer is a utility maximizer (rational) in the sense of (16).
The key result is the following remarkable theorem due to Afriat [16, 3, 2, 50, 48]
Theorem 3.2 (Afriat’s Theorem [2]). Given a data set D = {(αn,βn),n ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}}, the fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
5The budget constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 is without loss of generality, and can be replaced by α ′nβ ≤ c for any positive
constant c. A more general nonlinear budget incorporating spectral constraints will be discussed below.
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1. The system is a utility maximizer and there exists a monotonically increasing,6 continuous,
and concave utility function by satisfies (16).
2. For ut and λt > 0 the following set of inequalities has a feasible solution:
us−ut−λtα ′t (βs−βt)≤ 0 ∀t,s ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N}. (17)
3. Explicit monotone and concave utility functions7 that rationalize the dataset by satisfying
(16) are given by:
U(β ) = min
t∈{1,2,...,N}
{ut +λtα ′t (β −βt)} (18)
where ut and λt satisfy the linear inequalities (17).
4. The data set D satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) also called
cyclic consistency, namely for any t ≤ N, α ′tβt ≥ α ′tβt+1 ∀t ≤ k−1 =⇒ α ′kβk ≤ α ′kβ1.
Afriat’s theorem tests for economics-based rationality; its remarkable property is that it gives a
necessary and sufficient condition for a system to be a utility maximizer based on the system’s
input-output response. The feasibility of the set of inequalities (17) can be checked using a linear
programming solver; alternatively GARP can be checked using Warshall’s algorithm with O(N3)
computations [49] [47].
The recovered utility using (18) is not unique; indeed any positive monotone increasing transfor-
mation of (18) also satisfies Afriat’s Theorem; that is, the utility function constructed is ordinal.
This is the reason why the budget constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 is without generality; it can be scaled by an
arbitrary positive constant and Theorem 3.2 still holds. In signal processing terminology, Afriat’s
Theorem can be viewed as set-valued system identification of an argmax system; set-valued since
(18) yields a set of utility functions that rationalize the finite dataset D .
3.2 Framework. Cognitive Radar as a Utility Maximizer
Our working assumption is that a cognitive sensor satisfies economics-based rationality; that is,
a cognitive sensor is a utility maximizer in the sense of (18) with a possibly nonlinear budget
constraint. The main question then is:
How to use revealed preferences as a systematic method to detect cognitive radars?
We briefly discuss the key ideas in a simplified setting. Let k = 1,2, . . . denote discrete time (fast
time scale) and n= 1,2, . . . denote epoch (slow time scale). The framework is as follows, see Fig.7:
1. Our state xk is parametrized by our probe signal αn. In a classical linear Gaussian state space
model used in target tracking [8], our probe αn parametrizes the state noise covariance Q(αn)
which models acceleration maneuvers of our drone.
6We use monotone and local non-satiation interchangeably. Afriat’s theorem was originally stated for a non-
satiated utility function which is slight generalization of monotone.
7As pointed out in Varian’s influential paper [47], a remarkable feature of Afriat’s theorem is that if the dataset can
be rationalized by a monotone utility function, then it can be rationalized by a continuous, concave, monotonic utility
function. Put another way, continuity and concavity cannot be refuted with a finite datasaset.
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2. The enemy’s radar controller chooses an action βn (e.g. radar waveform) by optimizing a
utility function U(β ) subject to a possibly nonlinear constraint wrt (αn,β ). In a classical
target tracking model, βn parametrizes the observation noise covariance R(βn). From a prac-
tical point of view, when a radar adapts its waveform function8 βn, in effect it adapts the
measurement noise covariance R(βn).
3. Given the above linear Gaussian state space model with state noise covariance matrix Q(αn)
and observation noise covariance matrix R(βn), the enemy’s cognitive radar records mea-
surements yk of our kinematic state xk. The enemy uses a Kalman filter tracking algorithm to
compute the filtered posterior density pik = N(xˆk,Σk) where xˆk is the conditional mean state
estimate and Σk is the covariance of the estimate.
“Our” State with parameter αn
Radar Controller Tracking Algorithm
xk
yk
βn pik
αn
Enemy’s Cognitive Radar
Figure 7: Interaction of our dynamics with adversary’s cognitive radar. The cognitive radar com-
prises a Bayesian tracker which computes posterior pik, and a radar controller that chooses action
βk. Based on observing the time series (αn,βn),n = 1, . . . ,N, our goal is to determine if the radar
controller is a utility optimizer in the sense of (16).
It is well known that under the assumption that the linear Gaussian state space model parameters
satisfy detectability and stabilizability [5], the asymptotic covariance Σk+1k|k as k→∞ is the unique
non-negative definite solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (ARE):
A (α,β ,Σ) defn= −Σ+A(Σ−ΣC′ [CΣC′+R(β )]−1CΣ)A′+Q(α) = 0 (19)
where αn and βn are the probe and response signals of the radar at epoch n. Since Σ is parametrized
by α,β , we write the solution of the ARE at epoch n as Σ∗n(α,β ). We will use the ARE (19) to
describe our research plans in spectral revealed preferences below.
Example. Testing for Cognitive Radar: Spectral Revealed Preferences with
Linear Budget
We now show that Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 3.2) can be used to determine if a radar is cognitive.
The assumption here is that the utility function U(β ) maximized by the radar is a monotone func-
tion (unknown to us) of the predicted covariance of the target. Our main task is to formulate and
justify a linear budget constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 in Afriat’s theorem.
Specifically, suppose
8For details of ambiguity functions and waveform design we refer to [26]. It is here that important practicalities
regarding actual radar operation become important. As mentioned earlier, our collaborator Dr. Rangaswamy at AFRL
will provide us with a sophisticated test bed to emulate radar waveforms in a realistic environment.
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1. Our probe αn that characterizes our maneuvers, is the vector of eigenvalues of the positive
definite matrix Q
2. The radar response βn is the vector of eigenvalues of the positive definite matrix R−1.
Then the cognitive radar chooses its waveform parameter βn at each slow time epoch n to maximize
a utility U(·):
βn ∈ argmax
α ′nβ≤1
U(β ) (20)
where U is a monotone increasing function of β .
Then Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 3.2) can be used to detect utility maximization and construct a
utility function that rationalizes the response of the radar. Recall that the 1 in the right hand side
of the budget α ′nβ ≤ 1 can be replaced by any non-negative constant.
It only remains to justify the linear budget constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 in (20). The i-th component of α ,
denoted as α(i), is the incentive for considering the i-th mode of the target; α(i) is proportional
to the signal power. The i-th component of β is the amount of resources (energy) devoted by the
radar to this i-th mode; a higher β (i) (more resources) results in a smaller measurement noise
covariance, resulting in higher accuracy of measurement by the radar. So α ′nβ measures the signal
to noise ratio (SNR) and the budget constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 is a bound on the SNR. A rational radar
maximizes a utility U(β ) that is monotone increasing in the accuracy (inverse of noise power) β .
However, the radar has limited resources and can only expend sufficient resources to ensure that
the precision (inverse covariance) of all modes is at most some pre-specified precision Σ¯−1 at each
epoch n. We can then justify the linear budget constraint as follows:
Lemma 3.3. The linear budget constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1 implies that solution of the ARE (19) satisfies
Σ∗n
−1(αn,β ) Σ¯−1 for some symmetric positive definite matrix Σ¯−1.
The proof of Lemma 3.3 follows straightforwardly using the information Kalman filter formulation
[5], and showing that Σ∗−1 is increasing in β . Afriat’s theorem requires that the constraint α ′nβ ≤ 1
is active at β = βn. This holds in our case since Σ∗−1 is increasing in β .
To summarize, we can use Afriat’s theorem (Theorem 3.2) with αn as the spectrum of Q and βn
as the spectrum of R, to test a cognitive radar for utility maximization (20). Moreover, Afriat’s
theorem constructs a set of utility functions (18) that rationalize the decisions of the radar.
Summary: The above approach of spectral revealed preferences, i.e., choosing the probe signal
α as the spectrum of Q−1 and the response signal β as the spectrum of R, yields a novel class of
methods for detecting utility maximization behavior in a radar. To our knowledge, such methods
have not been studied in the context of adaptive sensing or inverse reinforcement learning. Also,
Statement 4 of the theorem is constructive; it yields explicit utility functions that rationalize the
decisions of the cognitive sensor. From a practical point of view, estimating the enemy sensor’s
utility function, allows us to predict (in a Bayesian sense) its future actions and therefore guard
against these actions.
Finally, although we will not elaborate here (due to lack of space), the above framework sets the
stage for future work that addresses the following deeper questions:
How to design cognitive sensors that barely pass Afriat’s theorem (or generalization)?
Equivalently: How to design smart (economic rational) sensors that appear dumb?
Are there useful cognitive radars that are not economic rational?
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3.3 Detecting Cognitive Radars in a Noisy Setting
If the sensor’s response βn is observed in noise, then violation of Afriat’s theorem could be either
due to measurement noise or absence of utility maximization. We will construct statistical detec-
tion tests to decide if the sensor is a utility maximizer and therefore “cognitive”. Our proposed
research builds on stochastic revealed preferences [18, 1, 4], and our previous works in [34, 7, 23].
Our plan proceeds as follows. To highlight the main ideas, assume additive measurement errors:
zn = βn+ εn, where εn ∈ Rm are iid (21)
Here zn is the noisy measurement of response (action) βn of the cognitive sensor.
Given the noisy data set Dobs = {(αn,zn) : n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}} , how can a statistical test be designed
for testing utility maximization (16) in a dataset due to measurement errors? Let H0 denote the
null hypothesis that the data set Dobs satisfies utility maximization. Similarly, let H1 denote the
alternative hypothesis that the data set does not satisfy utility maximization. Then:
Type-I errors: Reject H0 when H0 is valid.
Type-II errors: Accept H0 when H0 is invalid. (22)
We will design statistical tests to detect if an agent is seeking to maximize a utility function. Also
statistical tests will be constructed jump changes in the utility function as in our earlier work [7].
These tests evaluate the probability of the minimum perturbation required for the observed dataset
to fall inside the convex polytope specified by the revealed preferences inequalities (17).
Finally, we will derive analytical expressions for a lower bound on the false alarm probability.
3.4 Optimal Probing to Detect Utility Maximization Behavior
What choice of our probe signal yields the smallest Type II error (22) in detecting if the enemy
sensor is a utility maximizer, subject to maintaining the Type I error within a specified bound?
The framework above guarantees that if we observe the radar response in noise, then the probability
of Type-I errors (deciding that the radar is not a utility maximizer when it is) is less then a threshold
γ for the decision test. The goal is to enhance the statistical test by adaptively optimizing the probe
vectors α = [α1,α2, . . . ,αN ] to reduce the probability of Type-II errors (deciding that the radar is
cognitive when it is not). Our proposed framework is shown in Figure 8.
We will formulate the optimal probing problem as follows: Estimate optimal probe signals α as
argmin
α∈IRm×N+
J(α) = P
(
Error(α,β ,ε)> γ
∣∣{α,β (α)} ∈A )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of Type-II error
. (23)
Here P(· · · |·) denotes the conditional probability that the statistical test accepts H0, given that H0
is false. ε = [ε1,ε2, . . . ,εN ] is the noise variable defined in (21), and γ is the significance level. The
set A contains all the elements {α,β (α)}, with β (α) = [β1,β2, . . . ,βN ], where {α,β} does not
satisfy the GARP inequalities of Afriat’s Theorem 3.2.
Since Error(·) is not known explicitly, (23) is a simulation based stochastic optimization problem.
To estimate a local minimum value of J(α), we will use stochastic optimization algorithms such
as the simultaneous perturbation stochastic gradient (SPSA) algorithm [46].
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Figure 8: Optimizing the probe waveform to detect cognition in adversary’s radar by minimizing
the Type II errors subject to constraints in Type 1 errors.
3.5 Bayesian Revealed Preferences and Rational Inattention
We now briefly discuss an extension that invovles Bayesian revealed preferences for detecting
cognitive sensors. Suppose the enemy is a Bayesian cognitive sensor that chooses its action at
each time instant to maximize an expected utility function based on the noisy measurement of
an underlying state. Assume that the Bayesian agent is rationally inattentive, that is, obtaining
accurate measurements are expensive. This information acquisition cost affects the observation
chosen by the agent and hence affects the action chosen by the agent. We observe the dataset
of actions of the Bayesian agent and know the underlying state (our state). Our research aims to
address the question:
How to estimate the utility function and rational inattention cost of the Bayesian enemy?
Bayesian revealed preferences have been studied in the context of human decision making with
rational inattention in [10, 11]. Unlike Afriat’s Theorem 3.2, the utility function in the Bayesian
set-up is discrete valued; still one can construct a utility function that rationalizes the data. Rational
inattention by Bayesian agents was pioneered by Sims [45]. Rational inattention is a form of
bounded rationality - the key idea is that a sensor’s resources for information acquisition are limited
and can be modeled in information theoretic terms as a Shannon capacity limited communication
channel. The action a and information acquisition policy µ of a rationally inattentive Bayesian
agent are obtained by optimizing the following utility
max
µ
Ey
{
max
a
E{U(x,a)|y,µ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bayesian utility maximization
−λ( H(pi)−H(T (pi,y,µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rational Inattention cost
(Mutual information)
)}
, λ ∈ IR+ (24)
The first term in (24) is standard Bayesian utility maximization, namely, choosing action a to
optimize the conditional expectation of a utility function given noisy measurements y. But the
measurement y depends on the sensing mode µ used by the agent. It is here that the second
term in (24) comes in. The second term is the rational inattention cost: it is the difference in
the entropies of the prior and posterior when choosing an attention strategy µ . Clearly the more
accurate the posterior, the lower its entropy and hence the higher the cost. The motivation in
behavioral economics by Sims is that human attention is expensive and translating data into a
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decision is constrained by finite Shannon capacity to process information. In cognitive sensing,
the motivation for rational inattention is that the enemy’s sensor incurs a higher measurement cost
when it deploys a more accurate sensing mode.
The aim is devise revealed preference methods to detect if the enemy is a rationally inattentive
Bayesian utility maximizer; and then estimate the utility U in (24). This involves the so called
NIAS and NIAC conditions (with suitable modifications using a Bayesian tracker) described in
[10], which can be viewed as a Bayesian generalization of GARP in the classical Afriat’s theorem.
One can consider the more general Renyi entropy and divergence; which allows for more flexibility
in modeling sensor information (Renyi entropy is a generalization of Shannon entropy); see []. As
another extension, it is worthwhile consider stopping time problems where the horizon of decision
making is not one step but an integer valued random variable. Optimal stopping time formulations
are widely used in adaptive radars in the context of stochastic control [32, 33, 15]. An important
example is inverse quickest change detection; by observing the response of a rationally inattentive
cognitive sensor and detector, we will devise Bayesian revealed preference methods to estimate
the delay penalty and false alarm cost of the enemy’s detection algorithm. To our knowledge,
these have not been studied in the literature. Another extension is to estimate the costs involved in
multiple stopping time problems [31] given the response of the agent.
Summary and extensions. The ideas developed in this section constitute a principled framework
for inverse reinforcement learning of cognitive sensing systems. As mentioned earlier, revealed
preferences addresses a deeper and more fundamental question than classical inverse reinforce-
ment learning: does a utility function exist that rationalizes the given data (with signal processing
constraints) and if so, estimate it. The discussion presented above include several novel features
including spectral revealed preferences, detecting utility maximization behavior in noise, optimally
probing the enemy, and finally detecting Bayesian rationally inattentive behavior.
To keep the page length short, we have omitted two other ideas that we are currently pursuing:
(i) revealed preferences to detect play from the equilibrium of a potential game [22]; i.e., how
to determine if a dataset is consistent with play from the Nash equilibrium of a potential game
between the enemy and us. (ii) revealed preferences when the utility functions are only partially
orderable (on a lattice). This arises if the utility function as matrix-valued; e.g. covariance matrix
of the enemy’s Bayesian estimator. This involves estimating preferences on Hausdorff spaces.
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